Memory security
Memory has to be useful without being easy to drain.
A local memory system still needs a serious read-surface threat model. This track studies adaptive extraction attacks and the controls that keep recall powerful without making bulk exfiltration trivial.
What changes
The product idea in plain terms.
Define attacker tiers
Separate unauthenticated attackers, compromised same-namespace connectors, cross-namespace attempts, and co-resident processes.
Measure extraction
An attack harness can show how much memory an adaptive query loop can recover before mitigations.
Budget disclosure
Read-query budgets, anomaly detection, and response caps reduce bulk extraction without breaking normal recall.
- Bearer-token checks and namespace ACLs.
- Trust zones for provenance and poisoning resistance.
- Recall audit trails and access surfaces that support anomaly detection.
- PR #572 published the threat model; PR #619 added the ADAM harness and PR #633 published baseline ASR numbers.
- PR #638 and PR #649 added cross-namespace query budgets.
- PR #639, PR #650, PR #651, PR #652, PR #653, and PR #654 completed mitigation wiring, status checks, benchmarks, and docs.
Related Remnic pages